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An empirical analysis of the migratory responses
to US state immigration legislation∗
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I estimate the impact on population and employment for 52 different demographic groups of the recent influx of state
omnibus immigration laws targeting undocumented immigrants in the United States. I find evidence that while the
demographic groups pinpointed as having higher percentages of undocumented individuals certainly experience pop-
ulation and employment ’outflows’ from states implementing these immigration laws, there is a lack of associated
’inflows’ for those demographic groups identified by economic theory as being probable substitutes for undocumented
immigrants. Several segments designated as probable substitutes actually experience an adverse effect on popula-
tion and employment. This finding provides rigorous empirical backing to existing anecdotal evidence of the same
migratory phenomenon, resulting in clear policy implications in relation to the ongoing debate over immigration.
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I. Introduction
The recent influx of state immigration legislation in the United States provides an ideal quasi-
experimental setting appropriate for examining the connection between immigration and internal
migration. Since 2006, eleven different states have enacted fourteen omnibus immigration laws,
implementing broad restrictions in relation to issues affecting immigrants such as work authoriza-
tion, public program benefits, education, human trafficking and the transport and harbor of unau-
thorized immigrants, identification and driver’s license policies, and document-carrying policies.
A simple analysis of the incentives created by these wide-reaching omnibus laws leads to an ex-
pectation of outflows of the undocumented immigrant population from those states implementing
immigration laws, as well as possible inflows among other demographics not specifically targeted
by the new laws. Anecdotal evidence certainly provides backing to this expectation of immigrant
outflows, as there are numerous reports of large out-migrations, especially of the undocumented
population, in states which have recently put omnibus immigration laws into practice.1 How-
ever, much of this same anecdotal evidence also points to a lack of inflows of other demographic
groups into the immigrant-vacated jobs, leading to a shortage of workers in certain areas where
the outflows have been particularly strong. This anecdotal evidence begs the empirical analysis of
a simple yet important question, which is the focus of this study: Do immigrant outflows lead to
native inflows?
The approach to attack this question utilizes a straightforward, two-step process. First, I use mi-
crodata from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to analyze in great detail the pre- and post-
implementation numbers relating to both population and employment of demographic groups tar-
geted by the state immigration laws. By use of a difference-in-differences estimation that exploits
the natural experiment setting and employs a treatment and control group (the treatment being
the implementation of the state immigration law), I am able to verify if there truly are immigrant
outflows in response to the change in state policy. Second, using the same microdata along with
1See Robertson (2011) for one of many articles documenting this migratory response.
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the treatment and control process, I analyze the pre- and post-implementation numbers of the de-
mographic groups not targeted by the state immigration laws, permitting the identification of any
native (or documented immigrant) population or worker inflows (outflows) in those states experi-
encing targeted immigrant outflows.
The importance of the study’s findings is twofold. First, the documentation of the actual migra-
tory response to the surge of state immigration laws is important in its own right. While much
anecdotal evidence has been accumulated, detailed empirical analyses are lacking, possibly partly
due to the relative newness of this trend in immigration legislation and the difficulty inherent in
identifying the undocumented population. Second, there is an established literature examining the
relationship between immigration and internal migration responses. However, despite numerous
studies, this debate laden with key policy implications still has no clear victor. The present study
contributes to the ongoing debate by providing additional rigorous empirical evidence as to the re-
lationship between immigration and internal migration responses. My analysis indicates that while
the demographic groups pinpointed as having higher percentages of undocumented individuals in-
deed experience population and employment outflows from states implementing these immigration
laws, there is a lack of associated inflows for those demographic groups identified by economic the-
ory as being probable substitutes for undocumented immigrants. Although minimal substitution is
present, several segments of the population designated as probable substitutes actually experience
an adverse effect on population and employment.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper that exploits the implementation of state omnibus im-
migration laws to explicitly examine the question posited above: Do immigrant outflows lead to
native inflows? Card and Dinardo (2000) asks the question ’Do immigrant inflows lead to native
outflows?’ in the very title of the article - the experiment provided by the implementation of the
current state immigration legislation now allows for a natural examination of the opposite side
of their question, arguably just as important. This paper is most related to Raphael and Ronconi
(2009), which finds a significant out-migration of Hispanic immigrants from states passing immi-
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gration legislation. However, while similar in approach, their article examines only immigration
laws specifically targeting employment and the sample is limited to pre-2009 implementation of
laws, excluding a majority of this paper’s richer sample.
After providing a brief background of recent U.S. state immigration law and a review of the rel-
evant economic theory in section 2, I give specifics in section 3 as to the data and my empirical
strategy. Section 4 discusses the results of the difference-in-differences estimations for the various
demographic groups. I check for sensitivity and robustness in section 5, concluding in Section 6.
II. State Immigration Law
A brief overview
Evident from the statistics provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures, the recent
growth in the number of state immigration laws enacted in the United States is astounding. Table 1
outlines the number of immigration laws by category passed by state legislatures during the period
of 2005 to 2011, the number vetoed by governors, and the number ultimately adopted by states.2
A majority of the laws target a specific issue in relation to undocumented immigrants, such as
work authorization, public program benefits, or identification and licenses. While these focused
laws certainly lower the incentive for an undocumented immigrant to reside in the respective state
(some much more than others), a handful of states have implemented omnibus laws that address
multiple issues at the same time. These broad-reaching laws theoretically have the largest effect
on any outflows of immigrants, due to their nature of affecting not only employment opportunities,
but also possibly limiting access to food, health, and education benefits, and in general creating an
environment in which there is a constant threat of document verification and subsequent deporta-
tion. While the number of states enacting these multi-issue laws has been limited, 2011 brought a
2All statistics in this section are obtained from the National Conference of State Legislatures website,
www.ncsl.org. All categories listed at www.ncsl.org are included in Table 1 with the exception of ’resolutions,’ due to
the fact that these laws tend to have no relation to a detrimental effect on immigrants. Budget laws are included in the
’Miscellaneous’ category.
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particular surge - five states enacted omnibus legislation, while some eight states had similar legis-
lation pending by year’s end. Appendix 1 lists the fourteen states having already passed omnibus
laws, accompanied by a summary of the issues addressed in each law.
Theoretical impact
Understanding the theoretical effect of the implementation of state omnibus immigration laws on
the population and employment numbers of undocumented immigrants involves a simple cost and
benefit analysis. Assuming that each individual has some benefit and some cost corresponding to
living (working) in a particular geographic location, state immigration laws result in an increased
cost burdening each undocumented individual.3 This cost could take various forms: an evasion
cost, a discrimination cost, or a pyschological cost, just to name a few. If all individuals only
accept positive payoffs, a first indicator of an individual’s (re)location decision is if the associated
benefit is still higher than the now greater cost. However, even if the total payoff remains positive,
the relevant indicator is the comparison of that total payoff to all other available payoffs, those
potentially realized by migration to another US state or migration to another country. Clearly, if
other possible payoffs do not differ greatly from the payoff of the immigrant’s state of residence
before the implementation of omnibus immigration law, the extra cost imposed by implementation
could change an individual’s payoff-maximizing location, ultimately causing out-migration. How-
ever, if a particular location gives a pre-implementation payoff much higher than all other options,
a payoff-maximizing undocumented individual could rationally choose to stay in a state even after
implementation of immigration law.
An additional potential impact of immigration law is the effect implementation may have on em-
ployers, outlined in Raphael and Ronconi (2009). Most omnibus laws include some measure re-
lated to employment status verification, punishing employers caught hiring undocumented work-
3Although a substantial literature examines individuals’ decisions to migrate, many times detailing the specific
associated costs and benefits at great length, I choose to lump these into one generalized cost and benefit for each
individual for reasons of simplifying the demonstration of the theoretical impact of immigration law.
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ers. If this is the case, employers now bear a higher cost related to hiring this segment of the
population, translating into a lower payoff for undocumented individuals as the probability of ob-
taining the benefit associated with employment decreases.
Whether or not this hypothesized outflow of immigrants in turn incentivizes a response from the
native or documented immigrant population is a more complicated question, due to the fact that
the answer depends on the substitutability of these groups, a topic that numerous studies continue
to examine. As much of the undocumented population is relatively low-skilled, these studies gen-
erally focus on the production substitutability of low-skilled natives (or low-skilled, foreign-born
citizens) for immigrants. Ottoviano and Peri (2012) estimates that natives and immigrants of sim-
ilar skill in the U.S. are imperfect substitutes, while Borjas et al. (2008) estimates an infinite
substitution, pointing to the perfect subsitutability of these demographic groups. After finding im-
perfect substitution among similarly-skilled natives and immigrants, Card (2009) points out that
those most affected in terms of employment by the arrival of immigrants are those immigrants who
had previously established residence in the area under examination.
As the issue of substitutability continues to be debated, various additional studies empirically anal-
yse the related topic of whether immigrant inflows are associated with native outflows (the partner
research question to the present study), often focusing on how these flows may in turn affect work-
ers’ wages. Studies such as Filer (1992), Frey (1995), Borjas et al. (1997), and Borjas (2006)
contend that immigration inflows do lead to native outflows; on the other hand, others including
Wright et al. (1997), Card (2001), Kritz and Gurak (2001), and Peri (2008) argue that native
outflows, if present, do not stem from immigration inflows.
One of the central economic arguments stated by immigration law supporters, that of ’immigrants
take natives’ jobs,’ follows directly from the findings of the former group of studies. In the current
context of state immigration legislation, this reasoning implies that if immigrants in fact emigrate
to another state (or country), natives will fill those jobs that were previously ’taken.’ In the words
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of omnibus immigration law author Kris Kobach, this implication taken literally translates into ’if
you want to create a job for a US citizen tomorrow, deport an illegal alien today.’4 Logically, the
possible inflow of natives could manifest itself in one of two fashions: 1) population and worker
inflows of natives moving from other states looking to replace the immigrant-vacated positions, or
2) worker inflows from the native population already present in the respective state (previously ei-
ther unemployed or not in the labour force). The latter possibility includes no evident change of the
native population, as the only movement is in terms of employment. Following this line of think-
ing, this expected native inflow should be especially notable in times of high unemployment, such
as those experienced during much of the period in focus.5 Furthermore, since the geographical unit
under examination is at the state level, the empirical setup is particularly conducive to observing
this native inflow. Borjas (2006) points out that larger outflow (inflow) effects as a native response
to immigration are found ’the easier that natives find it to “vote with their feet”.’ If inflows are
indeed stemming mostly from within-state individuals previously not employed, this study obtains
the largest possible inflow observable since there is absolutely zero cost to moving. In fact, a
native inflow into employment does not even necessarily require ’voting with their feet.’ Consid-
ering these conditions stacking the deck in favor of observing native inflows, if these inflows do
not accompany immigrant outflows, the economic argument supporting stricter immigration policy
quickly loses any traction it may have had.
III. Data and Empirical Strategy
In detailing the different possible migratory manifestations, I examine the data from the CPS both
in terms of population and employment for all individuals ages 20 to 60. Monthly microdata covers
six years, allowing for analysis of the period August 2005 to September 2011. I classify the popu-
4I first encountered this commentary from the Kansas Secretary of State, who doubles as immigration advisor
to US presidential candidate Mitt Romney, as reported by Univision’s Noticiero Edición Nocturna (Nightly News
Edition). Video of Kobach’s related comments, as part of the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), is
readily accessible on the Internet.
5Unemployment rates calculated from the CPS reflect an average of nearly 7% unemployment in states at respective
times of omnibus law implementation. While high compared temporally to adjacent periods within states, the average
is below the national unemployment rate average of 7.7% for the same month-year combinations of implementation.
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lation and employment data according to 52 demographic groups, forming an essential part of my
empirical strategy. Demographic indicators include citizenship/nativity, race/ethnicity, and educa-
tion. Citizenship/nativity divides the population into four groups: US citizen/born in US, US nat-
uralized citizen/foreign-born, noncitizen/foreign-born, and noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to US
after 1982. While the first three are clearly mutually exclusive, the latter two are not, intentionally
allowing for what I call ’demographic narrowing.’ Demographic narrowing is my main strategy for
pinpointing and comparing the demographic groups most likely (not) affected by the implemen-
tation of immigration law. This necessity arises due to the fact that the CPS and other available
data sources do not specify legal or illegal status of the noncitizen population. However, by use of
undocumented population estimates and a well-constructed demographic narrowing process, I can
confidently identify those groups that are theoretically most affected.6 As an example, the spec-
ification of noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to US after 1982 allows for pinpointing the narrowest
group most likely targeted by the laws in terms of citizenship/nativity status. This group should
have more members of illegal status than the noncitizen/foreign-born because of the Immigration
Act of 1986, which legalized the residency of any immigrant present in the US prior to 1982.
While the obvious presence of many legal residents in the ’noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to US
after 1982’ category leaves this specification far from a perfect identification of the undocumented
population, the narrowing achieves a second-best approximation of the targeted population.7
Race/ethnicity separates individuals into four groups as well: white/non-Hispanic, black/non-
Hispanic, Asian/non-Hispanic, and Hispanic. This specific, perhaps unorthodox classification
marks an intentional effort to avoid potential ambiguity, given the manner in which the CPS race
and ethnicity questions are formulated. The survey classifies race by the options of ’white only,’
’black only,’ ’American Indian only,’ ’Asian only,’ ’Hawaiian only,’ or any combinations of the
6Passel and Cohn (2009) outlines these estimates, signaling for example, that of the 11.9 million undocumented
immigrants in the US, 76% are Hispanic.
7Achieving the ’best approximation,’ i.e. exact identification of the undocumented population, through surveys
such as the CPS may actually not be ideal for this paper’s purposes. If survey participants were explicitly asked about
legal residency status, many undocumented residents would likely not willfully respond to the survey, creating an even
stronger tendency toward non-response from this demographic than that which already exists.
8
above; Hispanic or non-Hispanic status is determined in a separate question. The problem arises
from the fact that these two classifications exhibit overlap; nearly all individuals who identify
themselves as Hispanic also identify race as white or black, with a lower number identifying the
other race categories. If this overlap were not accounted for and individuals were in turn classified
simply as white, black, or Hispanic, a majority of Hispanics would be double-counted, causing
an enormous problem of bias. Education simply classifies people as low-skilled or high-skilled,
completion of high school marking the upper limit of the low-skilled category.8
For each of the 52 demographic groups, I specify an econometric model of the following form.
Yit = c+αi + γt+β1Treatit +β2Postit+β3TreatitPostit + εit (1)
This fixed effects/difference-in-differences specification employs dummy variables for all states
and month-year combinations, represented by αi and γt , respectively. Yit is a placeholder for
the variable of interest, either population or employment of state i in month-year t for each de-
mographic group. Treatit is a dummy variable taking a value of one for all t if state i receives
treatment (omnibus immigration law implementation) at any point in the 2005 to 2011 period.
Postit is a dummy variable taking a value of one if for state i , period t is post-treatment. In turn,
TreatitPostit takes a value of one only when state i actually receives treatment in month-year t. αi
controls for any observable or unobservable systematic differences across states, while γt controls
for any differences over time that may affect all states’ outcomes, such as changes to federal immi-
gration law. β3 is the coefficient of interest, the difference-in-differences estimate representing the
change in the lefthand-side variable associated with omnibus immigration law implementation.9 I
8This education dividing line is selected based on results from Card (2009) finding that ’high school equivalent’
and ’college equivalent’ workers are imperfect substitutes.
9While the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) method is an attractive alternative to difference-in-
differences (DD), sometimes allowing for a ’more convincing analysis of a policy change’ (Imbens and Wooldridge,
2007), DDD does not improve on DD in this study’s case. The inclusion in DDD of the within-state control group is
problematic due to the fact that I expect some effect on the population and employment of those ’non-immigrant’ de-
mographic groups in states receiving treatment. If these groups were to form a within-state control group as part of the
DDD estimator, the measured effect of the state immigration legislation would obtain an upward bias. By employing
DD, I avoid this potential bias and therefore am able to separate out the effects on the various demographic groups and
their respective responses to implementation of the immigration laws.
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examine population and employment of the demographic groups in terms of both proportions and
levels. First, by expressing population (employment) as logarithms, I use the specified equation
to estimate the percentage change in the variable of interest associated with state immigration law
implementation. Second, I use the logarithm of the demographic group to state total ratio for each
variable of interest to estimate percentage changes in the composition of population (employment)
associated with the implementation of state immigration law.10
For each set of regressions, I define two different control groups: 1) neighboring states of each
respective state receiving treatment and 2) all U.S. states.11 While use of the first control group
permits a potential bias due to the possibility of outflows (inflows) affecting mainly neighboring
states, this possibility seems not to have manifested itself. The data shows only slight changes in
neighboring states’ population and employment after immigration law legislation. Furthermore,
this is to be expected - the immigrant outflows may be large especially in terms of percentages,
however the associated levels result in only small changes for receiving states when spread out over
many states of relocation. Nonetheless, the inclusion of the second control group, all US states,
allows for a simple comparison, theoretically minimizing any bias that may exist through use of
neighboring states in the regional control group.
The nature of the state omnibus immigration legislation process presents an additional problem in
relation to defining the point of separation for pre- and post-treatment, due to the varying lapse
of time between law enactment and implementation as well as various challenges to the legality
of the omnibus laws (outlined in Appendix 1). I choose the established implementation date (la-
belled as “effective” in Appendix 1) as the separation between pre- and post-treatment. Legislation
establishes this date at least by the time it is enacted, therefore giving a period on average of six
10For each ratio, the population (employment) of the specific demographic group being examined serves as the
numerator, while the state total serves as the denominator.
11I exclude states from control group consideration if treatment is received during or prior to the respective leg-
islation implementation period under examination. For the baseline regressions, six months on either side of the
legislation’s implementation date form the legislation implementation period and enter as observations into the regres-
sions.
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months for the population to adjust their employment/residency plans according to their expec-
tations. Therefore, even in states such as Oklahoma where legal challenges postponed complete
implementation of the immigration legislation, these expectations and accordingly adjusted plans
presumably still have an effect as far as population and employment movements resulting from the
omnibus laws.
Two additional aspects of my empirical strategy address specific critiques as to the preciseness of
difference-in-differences estimation expressed in the recent literature. First, by aggregating pop-
ulation and employment data at the state level rather than including individual-level observations
from the CPS in the specified regressions, I avoid the problem of common group errors presented
by multilevel data emphasized in Donald and Lang (2007). In addition, I follow the recommen-
dations of Bertrand et al. (2004) in calculating Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by
state for inference purposes, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations within
states and thereby accounting for the serious concern of serial correlation in the data.
IV. Results and Discussion
Of the 52 demographic groups identified by the three indicators in this study, Passel and Cohn’s
figures help point to the group of ’noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to US after 1982/Hispanic/low-
skilled’ as containing the highest percentage of undocumented population, and in turn theoret-
ically most likely to be negatively affected in terms of population and/or employment by state
immigration law implementation. In documenting the migratory outflows associated with the
state omnibus laws, I include estimates in Tables 2 and 4 for this narrowest demographic, as
well as the following broader demographic divisions, in descending order of expected percent-
age of undocumented population: ’noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to US after 1982/Hispanic,’
’noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to US after 1982,’ ’noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled,’
’noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic,’ and ’noncitizen/foreign-born.’ State immigration law’s impact
on population is outlined in Table 2, while the impact on employment is below in Table 4.
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In attempting to gauge the impact of the laws and any subsequent immigrant movements on
the behaviour of other demographic groups, I focus on several segments of the population with
no undocumented individuals that economic theory has presented as possible substitutes for the
already-mentioned groups with the highest percentages of undocumented immigrants.12 Borjas et
al. (2011) argues that similarly-skilled immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes according
to US labor evidence, while Card (2009) suggests that if immigrants and natives are imperfect
substitutes, additional immigrants would be the group designated as nearest-to-perfect substitute
for immigrants already present in the US. I take both findings to the data in the context of my
study, documenting the following demographic groups’ population changes in Table 3 and employ-
ment changes in Table 5: ’native/Hispanic/low-skilled,’ ’native/white, non-Hispanic/low-skilled,’
and ’native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled’ in order to capture any native-immigrant subsitutabil-
ity, and ’naturalized citizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled’ in order to capture any immigrant-
immigrant substitutability. To further shed light on the population and employment movement
responses to immigration law, I also include the total change of state population (employment)
associated with implementation of the legislation.
Impacts on Population
Fig. 1 gives an idea as to the migratory outflows of immigrants in terms of population during the
implementation period of omnibus immigration legislation. However, although an average decline
in the examined demographic’s proportion is observed in the six months after implementation, this
decrease is evidence from raw data not yet taking advantage of the treatment and control difference-
in-differences methodology necessary for obtaining the desired estimates of interest. Panel A of
Table 2 shows the impact on population associated with the immigration law implementation for
those demographic groups having the highest percentages of undocumented immigrants. I estimate
that the implementation of omnibus laws is associated with a 24.41% decrease in the low-skilled,
12By substitutes, I refer to the terminology used in labour economics, which identifies groups that tend to substitute
or complement one another, classified according to characteristics such as citizenship status, race/ethnicity, and skill
level.
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Hispanic, noncitizen population arriving post-1982 to the US, when comparing states receiving
treatment to those geographic neighbors not receiving treatment.13 While this group is the group
weighted most heavily with undocumented immigrants, even the group of foreign-born nonciti-
zens, which certainly has a much lower percentage of undocumented population, experiences a
decline of 9.93% associated with the law implementation. When the alternative control group of
all US states is used, minimizing the possible bias created by expected inflows to neighboring
states, the magnitude of these effects are only slightly attenuated, 19.02% and 8.22%, respectively.
Interestingly, since the total population also experiences an associated decrease, albeit small in
magnitude, the proportion changes detailed in Panel B of Table 2 are smaller in percentage terms
than their Panel A level counterparts. All estimates in Table 2 are statistically significant at the 5%
level, indeed pointing to a strong outflow of (undocumented) immigrant population in response to
the state omnibus immigration laws.
Estimates in Table 3 outline the impact on those groups identified by economic theory as possible
substitutes for immigrant groups, therefore leading to an expectation of inflows associated with
immigrant outflows. However, of the four groups examined, only the native, black/non-Hispanic,
low-skilled group has an associated population increase, magnitude of 6.51%. Both native and nat-
uralized citizen groups of low-skilled Hispanics actually reflect a clear population decline, losing
11.57% and 4.70% respectively. While these estimates are not as significant as those in Table 2,
the evidence does point to a lack of ’replacement’ population for the outflow of immigrants. This
fact is confirmed by the slightly negative estimates for total state population, -0.61% when em-
ploying the regional control group and -0.45% when including all US states. The negative impact
on groups not targeted by omnibus legislation is a noteworthy finding, likely due to one or both
of two possibilities. First, low-skilled, Hispanic legal immigrants (or natives) may be suffering a
type of workplace discrimination. As some of the omnibus legislation affects employers directly,
some employers may be more reluctant to hire any worker who fits whatever profile the employer
13The estimates reported in tables 2 to 5 approximate percentage changes, as population (employment) is expressed
in logarithmic form and estimates are then multiplied by a factor of 100.
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may associate with undocumented workers. On the other hand, this result could reflect that indi-
viduals in this demographic anticipate discriminatory treatment as a result of the immigration laws
and therefore relocate, or simply decide not to live and work in a place where laws could unfor-
tunately lead to instances of racial profiling. An additional consideration mentioned in Raphael
and Ronconi (2009) is the fact that some immigrant families are made up of both undocumented
and documented immigrants, leading to the out-migration of all family members when the undoc-
umented are targeted by immigration law. In either case, these figures point to a central complaint
of opponents of the state omnibus immigration laws - that on top of the negative effect on un-
documented immigrants, the legislation most likely has an unintended, adverse effect on certain
segments of the legal, documented immigrant population.
Impacts on Employment
Fig. 2 outlines the migratory outflows of immigrants in terms of employment during the imple-
mentation period of omnibus immigration legislation. Panel A of Table 4 displays estimates for the
immigrant demographic groups’ that reflect a decline in employment associated with implementa-
tion of the immigration laws. Estimates range from -20.73% to -10.62%, evidencing a notable fall
in employment, however generally slightly smaller in magnitude than that of these same groups’
population change using the regional control group. In line with the population estimates, use of
all US states as the control group results in employment estimates of a lower magnitude for the
examined immigrant demographic groups, with the largest effect being -16.32% for the noncitizen,
Hispanic, low-skilled, arrived to U.S. post-1982 group. Once again, estimates for these groups are
statistically significant, with only that of noncitizen/Hispanic not being significant at at least the
10% level, the majority significant at the 5% level.
In examining the possible substitute groups listed in Table 5, the estimates for employment high-
light two important trends. First, the immigration legislation again appears to adversely affect
segments of the population other than those groups with high percentages of undocumented im-
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migrants, even groups that are hypothesized to be substitutes for the immigrant groups. Panel A
of Table 5 shows a 10.89% and a 14.60% decrease in employment level, respectively, for native,
low-skilled Hispanics and naturalized citizen, low-skilled Hispanics when using regional control
groups. While these estimates do vary when changing to all US states as the control group of
choice, they remain clearly negative. The same two possibilities hypothesized above in the dis-
cussion of the population estimates provide the clearest explanation as to why this result obtains.
Second, for the group of native, low-skilled blacks (non-Hispanics), there does appear to be some
substitute or replacement effect in terms of employment. Estimates of 7.79% and 10.68% for
the regional and overall controls, respectively, signal a positive impact on employment for this
demographic. However, this rise in employment is not shared by native, low-skilled whites (non-
Hispanics), and the estimates throughout Table 5 are plagued by lower significance compared with
those of Table 4. In fact, the overall gauge of the impact on employment, the estimate for the state
total, is slightly negative using both control groups, just as in the case of population.
V. Checks on Initial Estimates
While the above estimates paint a relatively clear picture of the migratory responses to state im-
migration law implementation, the skeptical reader may raise concerns as to several issues worth
addressing, including the robustness, sensitivity, and reliability of the estimates.
Robustness and Sensitivity
To this point, results obtain through the examination of a one-year implementation period, includ-
ing all implementing states according to their effective date even if the actual implementation faces
delays due to legal challenges. In order to first check the robustness of these results, I explore what
changes may occur if Oklahoma’s effective date of November 2007 is excluded from the treatment
group. As detailed in Appendix 1, the courts initially prevented a major section of Oklahoma’s
omnibus law from taking effect. As previously explained, I include Oklahoma in the initial treat-
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ment group based on those expectations that accompany the effective date, even if not all sections
of the omnibus legislation ultimately take effect on this date. However, examining a second set of
regressions excluding Oklahoma allows for a simple check of whether the initial results are unduly
influenced by Oklahoma’s inclusion.
Tables 6 and 7 clearly show that the baseline results are robust to the exclusion of Oklahoma’s
effective date from the treatment group. The coefficients displayed in Table 6 show all negative
estimates larger in magnitude than those of Tables 2 and 4. This makes logical sense, since some
immigrants waiting until the last moment (the expected effective date) to out-migrate may have
opted to remain in Oklahoma when the employment section of this particular legislation did not
take immediate effect, resulting in a smaller outflow than that which would have otherwise oc-
curred. As in Table 2, all population estimates are significant at the 5% level, however unlike
Table 4, all employment estimates are now significant at the 5% level, as well. Comparing Table
7 with the corresponding Tables 3 and 5, population estimates in Table 7 are larger in magnitude
(both positive and negative), with no changes in sign from the previous tables. For example, using
the regional control results in a 14.53% decrease for native, low-skilled Hispanics and a 11.44%
increase for native, low-skilled blacks (non-Hispanics). On the other hand, Table 7 lists somewhat
attenuated employment estimates for the regional control, all coefficients consistent in sign with
the exception of native, low-skilled whites (non-Hispanics). Estimates for the change in total pop-
ulation (employment) are consistent with the baseline regressions, ranging from -0.36% to -0.57%,
although just as before the estimates for ’natives’ are not as significant as those for ’immigrants.’
Turning to the issue of timing, I examine how sensitive the results are to changing the length of the
implementation period. Tables 8 and 9 display the estimates of interest given a total implementa-
tion period of 6 months in Panel A, while estimates from total implementation periods of 2 years
are in Panel B.14 Six-month population and employment coefficients from Table 8 are extremely
14These are equivalent to a pre- and post-implementation period of 3 months each and 1 year each, respectively,
compared with the baseline regressions using a pre- and post-implementation period of 6 months each.
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similar in magnitude and significance to those of Tables 2 and 4, however two-year coefficients are
less significant and attenuated in magnitude, employment estimates for foreign-born non-citizens
turning slightly positive. While the magnitude and significance vary for six-month estimates in
Table 9, all signs remain consistent with those from Tables 3 and 5 except for population estimates
related to naturalized, low-skilled Hispanics. Two-year coefficients paint the same picture as the
corresponding six-month estimates, however there is additional sign disagreement in the estimates
for native, low-skilled blacks (non-Hispanics). In summary, while the baseline results do show
some sensitivity to altering the length of the examined implementation period, both the six-month
and two-year samples confirm general trends and resulting conclusions, the six-month results even
matching those of the baseline regressions in magnitude and significance.
Endogeneity Bias?
An important concern as to the reliability of the difference-in-differences estimates is the issue
of endogeneity. The implementation of state omnibus immigration legislation must be exogenous
in order for the estimates to capture the true effect on population and employment, free from
any endogeneity bias. Raphael and Ronconi (2009) addresses this concern in detail, pointing
to evidence from the Pew Hispanic Center’s National Survey of Latinos (NSL) as discounting the
possibility that the laws’ implementation are actually driven by other changes, leading to a problem
of endogeneity. They examine in detail both the possibility of higher levels of discriminatory
attitudes as well as that of changes in levels of discriminatory attitudes leading to immigration law
implementation; however, through the data provided by the NSL both of these possible arguments
of endogeneity are discarded.
An additional cause of endogeneity could arise from the simple case of the (undocumented) im-
migrant population increasing in size to a certain percentage of a state’s total population, arriving
to a tipping point which in turn triggers the beginnings of the process of immigration law en-
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actment and implementation.15 It is common knowledge that a network effect indeed exists in
the migration decision, resulting in regions with high percentages of immigrants tending to draw
more immigrants.16 However, while the network effect could point to a tipping point eventually
obtaining, its existence is clearly not sufficient for the tipping point to obtain. In fact, evidence
from Passel and Cohn (2009) refutes the tipping point theory, citing the fact that the ’undocu-
mented immigrant population grew rapidly from 1991 to 2006 but has since stabilized.’ Since this
stabilization occurred prior to the influx of state omnibus immigration legislation, any hesitation
as to endogeneity is somewhat pacified. However, to further examine this possibility, especially
given the fact that a lag between stabilization and immigration legislation implementation could
occur, I again examine the narrowest demographic - noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to US after
1982/Hispanic/low-skilled - specifically, I examine the exact proportion of each state’s population
made up by this group, measured one year before implementation of omnibus legislation. This date
serves as an approximate marker for when the legislative process of proposing and discussing new
legislation actually takes place. Fig. 3 (Fig. 4) shows the corresponding proportions of population
(employment) for each state implementing omnibus law, along with the proportions of the same
demographic group for all other states not implementing immigration law during the same period.
Table 10 lists the rank of each proportion compared to all other state counterparts for the same time
period.
Confirming the evidence from Passel and Cohn (2009), there does not appear to be a tipping point
that sets in motion the adoption of omnibus immigration legislation, as the proportions exhibit a
wide variety in their rankings. Using regional states as a comparison group, Georgia, Utah and Ari-
zona each rank third in the population measure among their respective regions, however Missouri,
Oklahoma and South Carolina rank in the bottom half of their regions, South Carolina ranking only
15One might imagine a different sort of tipping point, in which the (undocumented) immigrant population increases
in size until it gains sufficient political power to in turn influence immigration policy away from omnibus legislation.
However, I examine the tipping point in terms of triggering omnibus legislation due to the fact that many immigrants
(clearly, undocumented immigrants) do not have voting rights in the US and therefore have minimal political clout.
16For a sample of the literature examining network effects and the migration decision, see McKenzie and Rapoport
(2007).
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ninth out of eleven. Regional employment rankings reflect much the same, although Nebraska joins
the group of low-ranking states. Switching to all US states as a comparison group, Arizona and
Utah both experience relatively high overall proportions of population (employment) of the tar-
geted demographic group one year before implementation, however other implementing states can
be classified as having relatively moderate or low proportions. Missouri, South Carolina and Ok-
lahoma certainly qualify as having relatively low proportions of both population and employment,
with overall population rankings of 27, 26 and 27, respectively. Additionally, Nebraska’s overall
rank of 30 for employment is the lowest statistic among the legislation-implementing states.
Table 11 outlines a further test providing evidence against the tipping point theory. Panel A dis-
plays the results of regressing the implementation of state immigration law on the one-year lag of
the narrowest demographic proportion detailed above, while Panel B shows the results of regress-
ing the implementation of state immigration law on the one-year lag of the change in the narrowest
demographic proportion. Any positive relationship between this (change in) proportion and sub-
sequent immigration law implementation should clearly appear as positive, significant coefficients
in the regression results. However, coefficients are insignificant and imprecisely estimated, each
respective 95% confidence interval including the possibility of both a negative and a positive rela-
tionship between the two respective variables. Furthermore, if these estimates were significant and
precisely estimated, the association between the variables would remain small in scale given the
interpretation of the estimates. The highest coefficient in magnitude in Panel A signals that even
a one-unit increase in the narrowest demographic proportion (not possible since the independent
variable is a proportion measured between zero and one) is only associated with a 51% increase
in the probability that a state implements omnibus immigration legislation. Correspondingly, the
coefficient of highest magnitude in Panel B signals that a one-unit increase in the change of the
narrowest demographic proportion is associated with a 24% decrease in the probability that a state
implement omnibus legislation.
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Together with the evidence provided by Raphael and Ronconi (2009) and Passel and Cohn (2009),
these trends (or lack thereof) strongly signal that the tipping point theory is not in line with empir-
ical fact. The identified empirical strategy and resulting estimates are indeed free from worries of
endogeneity, thereby contributing a reliable estimation of the effect of immigration legislation on
population and employment of the examined demographic groups.
VI. Conclusion
The estimated impact of the implementation of state omnibus immigration legislation on total
state population and employment is consistently slightly negative, ranging from -0.45% to -0.61%
for population and -0.52% to -0.77% for employment. While somewhat imprecisely measured,
these estimates’ 95% confidence intervals indicate that they are almost certainly negative in sign,
leaving only a relatively small possibility of any positive relationship. With the exception of native,
low-skilled blacks (non-Hispanics), there appears to be no substitution in terms of inflows from
those demographic groups predicted by theory as being probable substitutes for the undocumented
immigrant population. Some of these groups actually experience an adverse impact on population
and employment associated with implementation of the immigration legislation. This adverse
impact is in addition to the highly statistically significant immigrant outflows of up to nearly a
quarter of the corresponding population, as large as 24.41% in terms of population and 20.71% in
terms of employment for the examined ’immigrant’ demographic groups.
These findings point to the fact that omnibus legislation not only has a negative effect on the undoc-
umented population, but it also unintentionally harms a much broader segment of the population.
With substitution inflows on a smaller scale than the corresponding outflows, the empirical ev-
idence clearly does not support the pro-immigration law partner statements of ’immigrants take
natives’ jobs’ and ’if you want to create a job for a U.S. citizen tomorrow, deport an illegal alien
today.’ This combination of adverse effects on population and employment at three demographic
levels - the undocumented population, the affected ’substitute’ groups that actually do not sub-
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stitute, and the total state populations - deserves careful consideration from not only economists,
but from the wider policymaking community as well. As increasing the welfare related to states’
population, especially in terms of employment, is the very reason posited by policymakers as jus-
tification for immigration law implemention, this trifecta of adverse effects leaves little doubt that
state omnibus immigration legislation is not completing its stated mission.
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Appendix 1
1. Georgia SB-529
• Enacted 17 April 2006; effective 1 July 2007
• work authorization, penalty for human trafficking, local immigration law enforcement,
determination of legal status when arrested, eliminates public benefits
2. Oklahoma HB-1804
• Enacted 8 May 2007; effective 1 November 2007
• work authorization, identification/driver’s licenses, local immigration law enforcement,
felony to harbor/transport unauthorized immigrants, eliminates public benefits
• Legal Challenge
– Employment section barred from taking effect, except for E-Verify system
3. Missouri HB-1549
• Enacted 7 July 2008; effective 28 August 2008 (1 January 2009)
• work authorization, identification/driver’s licenses, local immigration law enforcement,
eliminates public benefits
4. South Carolina HB-4400
• Enacted 4 June 2008; effective 4 June 2008 (except for work authorization - effective 1
January 2009)
• work authorization, identification/driver’s licenses, local immigration law enforcement,
eliminates public benefits, education restrictions
5. Utah SB-81
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• Enacted 13 March 2008; effective 1 July 2009
• work authorization, identification/driver’s licenses, local immigration law enforcement,
eliminates public benefits
6. Georgia HB-2
• Enacted 11 May 2009; effective 1 January 2010
• work authorization, determination of legal status when arrested, eliminates public ben-
efits
7. Missouri HB-390
• Enacted 7 July 2009; effective 7 July 2009
• work authorization, public benefits, education restrictions
8. Nebraska LB-403
• Enacted 8 April 2009; effective 1 October 2009
• work authorization, eliminates public benefits
9. Arizona SB-1070, HB-2162
• Enacted 23 April 2010; effective 29 July 10
• work authorization, local immigration law enforcement, warrantless arrest, citizens can
sue agencies for nocompliance, document-carrying policy
• Legal challenge by U.S. Department of Justice
– Three provisions preliminarily barred from taking effect
– Pending appeal by Arizona governor Jan Brewer
10. Utah H116, H466, H469, H497
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• Enacted 15 March 2011; effective
• work authorization, immigrant integration, proposed temporary worker program by
2013
• Legal challenge by Utah Coalition of La Raza
– H497 temporarily restrained
11. Georgia HB-87
• Enacted 13 May 2011; effective 1 July 2011 (except public benefits - effective 1 July
2012)
• work authorization, local immigration law enforcement, eliminates public benefits
• Legal challenge by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights et al.
– Two provisions enjoined preliminarily
12. Indiana SB-590
• Enacted 10 May 2011; effective 1 July 2011
• work authorization, eliminates public benefits, requests reimbursement of ’immigrant
cost’ from federal government
• Legal challenge by Ingrid Buquer, et al.
– Two provisions enjoined preliminarily
13. Alabama HB-56
• Enacted 9 June 2011; effective 1 September 2011
• work authorization, local immigration law enforcement, felony to harbor/rent to unau-
thorized immigrants, document-carrying policy, questioning of legal status in public
schools
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• Legal challenge by US Department of Justice
– Two provisions barred from taking effect 14 October 2011
14. South Carolina S-20
• Enacted 27 June 2011; effective 1 January 2012
• work authorization, identification/driver’s licenses, eliminates public benefits, felony
to harbor/rent to unauthorized immigrants
• Legal challenge by US Department of Justice
– Pending challenge filed 31 October 2011
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Table 1. Enacted state immigration laws: 2005 to 2011
Issue 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Education 3 3 22 12 27 17 20
Employment 5 14 29 19 21 27 27
Health 0 0 14 11 28 17 23
Human Trafficking 9 13 18 5 16 8 5
ID/Driver’s License 10 6 40 32 46 26 27
Law Enforcement 5 8 16 12 16 37 39
Miscellaneous 7 11 17 38 46 69 31
Omnibus 0 1 1 3 3 2 6
Public Benefits 5 10 33 9 15 9 15
Voting 1 6 0 1 4 6 4
Total Passed by Legislature 45 72 190 142 222 218 197
Vetoed by Governor 6 6 12 3 20 10 15
Total Enacted 39 66 178 139 202 208 182
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Table 2. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus immigration laws on
population: ’immigrants’
A. 100 × ln(population level) B. 100 × ln(population
proportion)
Demographic (1) (2) (1) (2)
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/arrived to US after
1982/Hispanic/low-skilled
-24.41 -19.02 -23.75 -18.51
s.e. (6.59) (6.75) (6.59) (6.75)
R2 0.962 0.963 0.904 0.902
n 901 3676 901 3676
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/arrived to US after
1982/Hispanic
-22.92 -19.27 -22.26 -18.79
s.e. (6.59) (6.78) (6.60) (6.79)
R2 0.972 0.968 0.926 0.912
n 910 3763 910 3763
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/arrived to US after
1982
-14.03 -11.39 -13.42 -10.94
s.e. (4.37) (4.02) (4.38) (4.08)
R2 0.978 0.982 0.920 0.925
n 924 3874 924 3874
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/Hispanic/
low-skilled
-19.57 -14.42 -18.92 -13.92
s.e. (5.96) (5.89) (5.96) (5.89)
R2 0.965 0.966 0.910 0.908
n 909 3707 909 3707
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/Hispanic -18.36 -14.75 -17.71 -14.28
s.e. (5.92) (5.93) (5.92) (5.93)
R2 0.975 0.971 0.932 0.918
n 913 3771 913 3771
Noncitizen/foreign-born -9.93 -8.22 -9.33 -7.77
s.e. (3.92) (3.54) (3.92) (3.58)
R2 0.980 0.983 0.927 0.931
n 924 3874 924 3874
Control Region All Region All
Panel A: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the log of population of the corresponding demographic group for state-month-
year combinations as the dependent variable. Population includes all CPS data (using given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60 during
each implementation period. All regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences across states
as well as any differences over time that may affect all states’ outcomes. Column (1) reports estimates using the regional control groups, while
column (2) employs all US states as a control for states implementing immigration legislation. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states.
Panel B: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the proportion of the log of population of the corresponding demographic group
in the total state population for state-month-year combinations as the dependent variable. Population includes all CPS data (using given sampling
weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60 during each implementation period. All regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for any
existing systematic differences across states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states’ outcomes. Column (1) reports estimates
using the regional control groups, while column (2) employs all US states as a control for states implementing immigration legislation. Huber-White
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states.
The treatment sample in each panel includes all population observations six months before and after implementation for those states adopting
omnibus immigration legislation. Control groups include observations for all states not adopting omnibus immigration legislation during the one-
year implementation period. States having previously adopted omnibus legislation are additionally excluded from the control groups. The estimate
reported is the interaction between the indicator for 1 to 6 months post-implementation and the treatment indicator.
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Table 3. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus immigration laws on
population: ’natives’
A. 100 × ln(Population Level) B. 100 × ln(Population
Proportion)
Demographic (1) (2) (1) (2)
native/Hispanic/low-skilled -11.57 -7.16 -10.97 -6.71
s.e. (7.28) (6.92) (7.32) (6.97)
R2 0.954 0.961 0.917 0.908
n 886 3791 886 3791
native/white,
non-Hispanic/low-skilled -0.93 -0.36 -0.32 0.09
s.e. (1.18) (1.21) (1.14) (1.24)
R2 0.996 0.997 0.978 0.982
n 924 3876 924 3876
native/black,
non-Hispanic/low-skilled 6.51 5.80 7.11 6.23
s.e. (5.40) (5.24) (5.30) (5.11)
R2 0.982 0.980 0.964 0.952
n 894 3715 894 3715
naturalized citizen/foreign-
born/Hispanic/low-skilled -4.70 -7.68 -3.99 -7.22
s.e. (8.36) (8.08) (8.27) (7.96)
R2 0.925 0.931 0.831 0.806
n 816 3483 816 3483
total -0.61 -0.45 — —
s.e. (0.38) (0.46) — —
R2 0.999 0.999 — —
n 924 3876 — —
Control Region All Region All
Panel A: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the log of population of the corresponding demographic group for state-month-
year combinations as the dependent variable. Population includes all CPS data (using given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60 during
each implementation period. All regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences across states
as well as any differences over time that may affect all states’ outcomes. Column (1) reports estimates using the regional control groups, while
column (2) employs all US states as a control for states implementing immigration legislation. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states.
Panel B: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the proportion of the log of population of the corresponding demographic group
in the total state population for state-month-year combinations as the dependent variable. Population includes all CPS data (using given sampling
weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60 during each implementation period. All regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for
any existing systematic differences across states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states’ outcomes. Column (1) reports
estimates using the regional control groups, while column (2) employs all U.S. states as a control for states implementing immigration legislation.
Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states.
The treatment sample in each panel includes all population observations six months before and after implementation for those states adopting
omnibus immigration legislation. Control groups include observations for all states not adopting omnibus immigration legislation during the one-
year implementation period. States having previously adopted omnibus legislation are additionally excluded from the control groups. The estimate
reported is the interaction between the indicator for 1-6 months post-implementation and the treatment indicator.
31
Table 4. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus immigration laws on
employment: ’immigrants’
A. 100× ln(Employment Level) B. 100 × ln(Employment
Proportion)
Demographic (1) (2) (1) (2)
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/arrived to US after
1982/Hispanic/low-skilled
-20.73 -16.32 -21.17 -17.03
s.e. (7.34) (7.08) (7.22) (7.08)
R2 0.953 0.956 0.885 0.882
n 899 3627 899 3627
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/arrived to US after
1982/Hispanic
-19.52 -16.42 -19.96 -17.16
s.e. (7.55) (7.25) (7.44) (7.20)
R2 0.964 0.961 0.903 0.890
n 904 3715 904 3715
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/arrived to US after
1982
-12.89 -9.12 -13.41 -9.89
s.e. (4.98) (4.50) (4.83) (4.45)
R2 0.977 0.979 0.913 0.915
n 923 3870 923 3870
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/Hispanic/
low-skilled
-16.59 -13.92 -17.03 -14.63
s.e. (6.61) (6.18) (6.46) (6.17)
R2 0.958 0.960 0.896 0.892
n 907 3670 907 3670
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/Hispanic -15.23 -13.29 -15.67 -14.02
s.e. (6.78) (6.37) (6.65) (6.31)
R2 0.968 0.965 0.913 0.901
n 907 3731 907 3731
Noncitizen/foreign-born -10.62 -7.90 -11.14 -8.67
s.e. (4.48) (4.07) (4.33) (4.00)
R2 0.979 0.982 0.920 0.925
n 924 3871 924 3871
Control Region All Region All
Panel A: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the log of employment of the corresponding demographic group for state-
month-year combinations as the dependent variable. Employment includes all CPS data (using given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20
to 60 during each implementation period. All regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences
across states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states’ outcomes. Column (1) reports estimates using the regional control
groups, while column (2) employs all US states as a control for states implementing immigration legislation. Huber-White robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states.
Panel B: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the proportion of the log of employment of the corresponding demographic
group among the total state employment for state-month-year combinations as the dependent variable. Employment includes all CPS data (using
given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60 during each implementation period. All regressions include state and month-year effects,
controlling for any existing systematic differences across states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states’ outcomes. Column
(1) reports estimates using the regional control groups, while column (2) employs all US states as a control for states implementing immigration
legislation. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations within
states.
The treatment sample in each panel includes all employment observations six months before and after implementation for those states adopting
omnibus immigration legislation. Control groups include observations for all states not adopting omnibus immigration legislation during the one-
year implementation period. States having previously adopted omnibus legislation are additionally excluded from the control groups. The estimate
reported is the interaction between the indicator for 1 to 6 months post-implementation and the treatment indicator.
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Table 5. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus immigration laws on
employment: ’natives’
A. 100× ln(Employment Level) B. 100 × ln(Employment
Proportion)
Demographic (1) (2) (1) (2)
native/Hispanic/low-skilled -10.89 -4.05 -11.46 -4.82
s.e. (10.28) (10.45) (10.30) (10.54)
R2 0.944 0.953 0.898 0.887
n 872 3735 872 3735
native/white,
non-Hispanic/low-skilled 0.73 2.10 0.21 1.33
s.e. (1.44) (1.36) (1.35) (1.30)
R2 0.993 0.995 0.967 0.974
n 924 3876 924 3876
native/black,
non-Hispanic/low-skilled 7.79 10.68 7.24 9.93
s.e. (6.54) (5.80) (6.56) (5.74)
R2 0.973 0.970 0.948 0.933
n 872 3612 872 3612
naturalized citizen/foreign-
born/Hispanic/low-skilled -14.60 -16.48 -15.14 -17.47
s.e. (9.06) (7.84) (8.93) (7.79)
R2 0.921 0.922 0.828 0.788
n 826 3397 826 3397
total -0.52 -0.77 — —
s.e. (0.58) (0.58) — —
R2 0.999 0.999 — —
n 924 3876 — —
Control Region All Region All
Panel A: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the log of employment of the corresponding demographic group for state-
month-year combinations as the dependent variable. Employment includes all CPS data (using given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20
to 60 during each implementation period. All regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences
across states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states’ outcomes. Column (1) reports estimates using the regional control
groups, while column (2) employs all U.S. states as a control for states implementing immigration legislation. Huber-White robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states.
Panel B: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the proportion of the log of employment of the corresponding demographic
group among the total state employment for state-month-year combinations as the dependent variable. Employment includes all CPS data (using
given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60 during each implementation period. All regressions include state and month-year effects,
controlling for any existing systematic differences across states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states’ outcomes. Column
(1) reports estimates using the regional control groups, while column (2) employs all U.S. states as a control for states implementing immigration
legislation. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations within
states.
The treatment sample in each panel includes all employment observations six months before and after implementation for those states adopting
omnibus immigration legislation. Control groups include observations for all states not adopting omnibus immigration legislation during the one-
year implementation period. States having previously adopted omnibus legislation are additionally excluded from the control groups. The estimate
reported is the interaction between the indicator for 1 to 6 months post-implementation and the treatment indicator.
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Table 6. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus immigration laws on
population and employment (no Oklahoma): ’immigrants’
A. Population B. Employment
Demographic (1) (2) (1) (2)
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/arrived to US after
1982/Hispanic/low-skilled
-31.05 -26.25 -19.37 -18.01
s.e. (6.47) (6.84) (6.72) (7.85)
R2 0.966 0.963 0.961 0.957
n 781 3117 779 3073
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/arrived to US after
1982/Hispanic
-28.88 -25.41 -18.55 -18.58
s.e. (6.71) (7.12) (7.06) (8.06)
R2 0.975 0.968 0.968 0.961
n 790 3189 7784 3149
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/arrived to US after
1982
-16.49 -14.53 -12.60 -11.17
s.e. (4.59) (4.13) (4.79) (4.66)
R2 0.979 0.981 0.978 0.979
n 804 3286 803 3282
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/Hispanic/
low-skilled
-27.38 -23.01 -15.54 -14.97
s.e. (5.80) (5.85) (6.17) (6.85)
R2 0.968 0.966 0.965 0.961
n 789 3147 787 3113
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/Hispanic -25.27 -22.19 -14.45 -14.82
s.e. (5.95) (6.14) (6.41) (7.08)
R2 0.978 0.971 0.972 0.965
n 793 3196 787 3162
Noncitizen/foreign-born -13.24 -12.30 -10.42 -9.97
s.e. (4.09) (3.58) (4.33) (4.19)
R2 0.981 0.983 0.979 0.982
n 804 3286 804 3283
Control Region All Region All
Estimates correspond to those found in Tables 2 and 4, excluding Oklahoma’s effective date of November 2007 from the treatment group. In
addition, I report only population and employment levels, not proportions. Panel A displays estimates associated with population, while Panel B
displays estimates associated with employment.
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Table 7. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus immigration laws on
population and employment (no Oklahoma): ’natives’
A. Population B. Employment
Demographic (1) (2) (1) (2)
native/Hispanic/low-skilled -14.53 -11.49 -11.27 -10.71
s.e. (7.88) (7.47) (10.17) (9.89)
R2 .952 0.962 0.940 0.954
n 774 3223 761 3173
native/white,
non-Hispanic/low-skilled -0.67 -0.24 0.85 1.28
s.e. (1.23) (1.39) (1.41) (1.45)
R2 0.996 0.997 0.994 0.995
n 804 3288 804 3288
native/black,
non-Hispanic/low-skilled 11.44 8.58 8.18 12.66
s.e. (6.08) (5.96) (6.64) (6.64)
R2 0.982 0.980 0.974 0.970
n 774 3159 753 3069
naturalized citizen/foreign-
born/Hispanic/low-skilled -6.25 -10.27 -11.65 -17.00
s.e. (8.79) (8.05) (8.55) (7.94)
R2 0.929 0.934 0.916 0.923
n 707 2961 694 2882
total -0.45 -0.36 -0.57 -0.47
s.e. (0.42) (0.49) (0.57) (0.59)
R2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
n 804 3288 804 3288
Control Region All Region All
Estimates correspond to those found in Tables 3 and 5, excluding Oklahoma’s effective date of November 2007 from the treatment group. In
addition, I report only population and employment levels, not proportions. Panel A displays estimates associated with population, while Panel B
displays estimates associated with employment.
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Table 8. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus immigration laws on
population and employment: ’immigrants’
A. Six-month implementation
period
B. Two-year implementation period
Population Employment Population Employment
Demographic (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/arrived to US after
1982/Hispanic/low-
skilled
-24.75 -19.29 -10.09 -14.60 -7.11 -6.38 -4.63 -2.38
s.e. (9.54) (10.57) (8.81) (10.38) (5.08) (5.23) (5.95) (6.19)
R2 0.968 0.966 0.964 0.958 0.957 0.962 0.945 0.955
n 454 1846 457 1817 1751 7216 1737 7117
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/arrived to US after
1982/Hispanic
-21.97 -16.54 -12.10 -16.89 -8.26 -8.96 -6.51 -5.75
s.e. (9.38) (10.70) (8.93) (10.12) (5.11) (5.08) (6.05) (6.13)
R2 0.976 0.969 0.967 0.962 0.965 0.968 0.952 0.960
n 459 1883 459 1854 1765 7392 1747 7285
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/arrived to US after
1982
-10.90 -8.71 -9.55 -11.24 -5.07 -4.17 -2.50 -2.41
s.e. (6.25) (5.86) (6.46) (5.89) (3.15) (3.04) (3.59) (3.55)
R2 0.980 0.982 0.981 0.981 0.976 0.981 0.975 0.979
n 462 1936 462 1934 1801 7629 1795 7617
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/Hispanic/
low-skilled
-22.28 -17.71 -10.85 -14.74 -3.60 -2.84 -1.10 0.86
s.e. (8.54) (9.05) (8.40) (9.21) (4.56) (4.65) (5.24) (5.41)
R2 0.970 0.968 0.968 0.961 0.961 0.965 0.952 0.958
n 455 1860 460 1839 1760 7263 1747 7178
Noncitizen/foreign-
born/Hispanic -19.32 -14.56 -11.59 -15.53 -5.27 -5.77 -3.43 -2.62
s.e. (8.24) (9.23) (8.20) (9.15) (4.52) (4.47) (5.35) (5.40)
R2 0.978 0.972 0.973 0.967 0.968 0.971 0.959 0.964
n 459 1886 460 1863 1768 7405 1751 7314
Noncitizen/foreign-born -8.60 -7.51 -8.10 -10.36 -1.98 -1.34 0.42 0.31
s.e. (5.57) (5.19) (5.76) (5.49) (2.84) (2.71) (3.27) (3.21)
R2 0.981 0.983 0.982 0.983 0.978 0.983 0.977 0.982
n 462 1936 462 1934 1801 7629 1798 7623
Control Region All Region All Region All Region All
.
Estimates correspond to those found in Tables 2 and 4, however resulting from either six-month or two-year total implementation periods.
Panel A displays estimates associated the six-month window, while Panel B displays estimates associated with the two-year window. I report only
population and employment levels, not proportions.
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Table 9. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus immigration laws on
population and employment: ’natives’
A. Six-month implementation
period
B. Two-year implementation period
Population Employment Population Employment
Demographic (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
native/Hispanic/low-
skilled -24.60 -21.30 -2.45 -12.28 -4.75 -2.56 -7.98 -5.70
s.e. (10.57) (9.87) (13.58) (13.32) (6.20) (5.91) (7.12) (6.73)
R2 0.958 0.963 0.959 0.956 0.947 0.960 0.937 0.950
n 446 1900 449 1875 1729 7463 1701 7354
native/white, non-
Hispanic/low-skilled -3.23 -2.89 -2.72 -0.30 -0.59 -0.43 -1.55 -1.40
s.e. (1.37) (1.61) (2.27) (2.02) (0.90) (0.89) (1.07) (1.04)
R2 0.997 0.997 0.996 0.994 0.996 0.997 0.993 0.994
n 462 1938 462 1938 1801 7632 1799 7632
native/black, non-
Hispanic/low-skilled 5.10 4.16 13.17 15.59 0.47 -1.75 0.33 -0.05
s.e. (7.81) (7.27) (10.62) (8.54) (4.20) (4.08) (4.73) (4.68)
R2 0.984 0.981 0.974 0.971 0.980 0.979 0.972 0.971
n 448 1858 433 1818 1743 7329 1696 7104
naturalized
citizen/foreign-
born/Hispanic/low-
skilled
6.51 6.64 -1.05 -3.15 8.55 4.03 -1.81 5.97
s.e. (11.49) (11.63) (12.22) (12.40) (6.20) (5.83) (3.05) (6.38)
R2 0.933 0.931 0.939 0.920 0.916 0.928 0.908 0.921
n 411 1735 417 1691 1589 6818 1565 6618
total -0.65 -0.54 -0.45 -1.04 0.06 0.09 0.26 0.12
s.e. (0.43) (0.58) (0.62) (0.50) (0.28) (0.34) (0.43) (0.44)
R2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
n 462 1938 462 1938 1801 7632 1799 7632
Control Region All Region All Region All Region All
Estimates correspond to those found in Tables 3 and 5, however resulting from either six-month or two-year total implementation periods.
Panel A displays estimates associated with the six-month window, while Panel B displays estimates associated with the two-year window. I report
only population and employment levels, not proportions.
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Table 10. Rankings one year before implementation
State Population Employment
Georgia 3/12 9/49 3/12 8/49
Oklahoma 7/10 27/49 8/10 28/49
Missouri 6/11 27/44 6/11 27/44
South Carolina 9/11 26/44 8/11 25/44
Utah 3/10 4/44 3/10 4/44
Nebraska 4/11 21/44 7/11 30/44
Arizona 3/10 4/44 3/10 5/44
Group of Comparison Region All Region All
Population (employment) is measured as the proportion of low-skilled,
Hispanic immigrants arriving to the US after 1982 among the total population
(employed) in each state (ages 20 to 60), with a ranking of one designating the
highest proportion.
Table 11. Estimates of the impact of the ’narrowest demographic’ on state immigration legislation
implementation
A. Percentage of
’narrowest demographic’
B. Change in percentage of
’narrowest demographic’
Population Employment Population Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient 0.51 0.15 0.34 0.09 -0.24 -0.05 -0.22 -0.04
s.e. (0.40) (0.10) (0.44) (0.11) (0.31) (0.08) (0.34) (0.08)
95% lower bound -0.27 -0.04 -0.53 -0.12 -0.85 -0.19 -0.89 -0.20
95% upper bound 1.28 0.33 1.21 0.29 0.37 0.10 0.45 0.12
Control Region All Region All Region All Region All
Each estimate is from an OLS regression with the dummy variable for omnibus immigration legislation implementation as the dependent
variable. Reported estimates have the following interpretation for Panel A: a one unit increase in the percentage of the narrowest demographic
in total state population (employment) is associated with a 100%*coefficient increase in the probability of state immigration legislation imple-
mentation. Reported estimates have the following interpretation for Panel B: a one unit increase in the change in the percentage of the narrowest
demographic in total state population (employment) is associated with a 100%*coefficient increase in the probability of state immigration legislation
implementation.
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Note: Black and white figures are provided after each corresponding color figure.
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Fig. 1. Population during implementation period
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Fig. 1. Population during implementation period
Population is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving to the US after 1982 in the total state population (ages 20 to
60). Proportions displayed are measured during the one-year implementation period, consisting of six months before and after the implementation
date of state omnibus immigration legislation. Implementation month-year combinations are indicated in the middle of the x-axis of each panel.
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Fig. 2. Employment during implementation period
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Fig. 2. Employment during implementation period
Employment is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving to the US after 1982 among the total employed in each
state (ages 20 to 60). Proportions displayed are measured during the one-year implementation period, consisting of six months before and after the
implementation date of state omnibus immigration legislation. Implementation month-year combinations are indicated in the middle of the x-axis
of each panel.
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Fig. 3. Population
Georgia
0
.05
.1
.15
July 2006
Oklahoma
0
.05
.1
.15
November 2006
Missouri
South Carolina
0
.05
.1
.15
January 2008
Utah
0
.05
.1
.15
July 2008
Nebraska
0
.05
.1
.15
October 2008
Arizona
0
.05
.1
.15
August 2009
Fig. 3. Population
Population is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving to the US after 1982 in the total state population (ages 20 to
60). Proportions displayed are measured one year before implementation of omnibus immigration law for each state implementing legislation, as
well as the corresponding nonimplementing states for each given implementation period.
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Fig. 4. Employment
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Fig. 4. Employment
Employment is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving to the US after 1982 among the total employed in each
state (ages 20 to 60). Proportions displayed are measured one year before implementation of omnibus immigration law for each state
implementing legislation, as well as the corresponding nonimplementing states for each given implementation period.
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